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Abstract
We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing
regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply
these algorithms to extensive-form games, a distance-generating function is needed. We study
the use of the dilated entropy and dilated Euclidean distance functions. For the dilated Euclidean
distance function we prove the first explicit bounds on the strong-convexity parameter for general
treeplexes. Furthermore, we show that the use of dilated distance-generating functions enable us
to decompose the mirror descent algorithm, and its optimistic variant, into local mirror descent
algorithms at each information set. This decomposition mirrors the structure of the counterfactual
regret minimization framework, and enables important techniques in practice, such as distributed
updates and pruning of cold parts of the game tree. Our algorithms provably converge at a rate of
T−1, which is superior to prior counterfactual regret minimization algorithms. We experimentally
compare to the popular algorithm CFR+, which has a theoretical convergence rate of T−0.5 in
theory, but is known to often converge at a rate of T−1, or better, in practice. We give an example
matrix game where CFR+ experimentally converges at a relatively slow rate of T−0.74, whereas
our optimistic methods converge faster than T−1. We go on to show that our fast rate also holds
in the Kuhn poker game, which is an extensive-form game. For games with deeper game trees
however, we find that CFR+ is still faster. Finally we show that when the goal is minimizing
regret, rather than computing a Nash equilibrium, our optimistic methods can outperform CFR+,
even in deep game trees.
∗This paper was accepted for publication at NeurIPS 2019.
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1. Introduction
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a broad class of games that can model sequential interaction, imperfect
information, and stochastic outcomes. To operationalize them they must be accompanied by techniques for
computing game-theoretic equilibria such as Nash equilibrium. A notable success story of this is poker:
Bowling et al. (2015) computed a near-optimal Nash equilibrium for heads-up limit Texas hold’em, while
Brown & Sandholm (2017b) beat top human specialist professionals at the larger game of heads-up no-limit
Texas hold’em. Solving extremely large EFGs relies on many methods for dealing with the scale of the
problem: abstraction methods are sometimes used to create smaller games (Gilpin & Sandholm, 2007;
Lanctot et al., 2012; Kroer & Sandholm, 2014; Ganzfried & Sandholm, 2014; Brown et al., 2015; Kroer
& Sandholm, 2016), endgame solving is used to compute refined solutions to the end of the game in real
time (Burch et al., 2014; Ganzfried & Sandholm, 2015; Moravcik et al., 2016), and recently depth-limited
subgame solving has been very successfully used in real time (Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2018;
Brown & Sandholm, 2019b). At the core of all these methods is a reliance on a fast algorithm for computing
approximate Nash equilibria of the abstraction, endgame, and/or depth-limited subgame (Moravcˇík et al.,
2017; Brown et al., 2018; Brown & Sandholm, 2019b). In practice the most popular method has been the
CFR+ algorithm (Zinkevich et al., 2007; Tammelin et al., 2015), which was used within all three two-player
poker breakthroughs (Bowling et al., 2015; Moravcˇík et al., 2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2017b). CFR+ has
been shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium at a rate of T−0.5, but in practice it often performs much
better, even outperforming faster methods that have a guaranteed rate of T−1 (Brown et al., 2017; Kroer
et al., 2018b;a; Brown & Sandholm, 2019a).
Recently, another class of optimization algorithms has been shown to have appealing theoretical properties.
Online convex optimization (OCO) algorithms are online variants of first-order methods: at each timestep t
they receive some loss function `t (often a linear loss which is a gradient of some underlying loss function),
and must then recommend a point from some convex set based on the series of past points and losses. While
these algorithms are generally known to have a T−0.5 rate of convergence when solving static problems,
a recent series of papers showed that when two optimistic OCO algorithms are faced against each other,
and they have some estimate of the next loss faced, a rate of T−1 can be achieved (Rakhlin & Sridharan,
2013a;b; Syrgkanis et al., 2015). In this paper we investigate the application of these algorithms to EFG
solving, both in the regret-minimization setting, and for computing approximate Nash equilibria at the
optimal rate of O(T−1). The only prior attempt at using optimistic OCO algorithm in extensive-form games
is due to Farina et al. (2019). In that paper, the authors show that by restricting to the weaker notion of
stable-predictive optimism, one can mix and match local stable-predictive optimistic algorithm at every
decision point in the game as desired and obtain an overall stable-predictive optimistic algorithm that
enables O(T−0.75) convergence to Nash equilibrium. The approach we adopt in this paper is different from
that of Farina et al. (2019) in that our construction does not allow one to pick different regret minimizers
for different decision points; however, our algorithms converge to Nash equilibrium at the improved rate
O(T−1).
The main hurdle to overcome is that in all known OCO algorithms a distance-generating function (DGF) is
needed to maintain feasibility via proximal operators and ensure that the stepsizes of the algorithms are
appropriate for the convex set at hand. For the case of EFGs, the convex set is known as a treeplex, and the
so-called dilated DGFs are known to have appealing properties, including closed-form iterate updates and
strong convexity properties (Hoda et al., 2010; Kroer et al., 2018b). In particular, the dilated entropy DGF,
which applies the negative entropy at each information set, is known to lead to the state-of-the-art theoretical
rate on convergence for iterative methods (Kroer et al., 2018b). Another potential DGF is the dilated
Euclidean DGF, which applies the `2 norm as a DGF at each information set. We show the first explicit
bounds on the strong-convexity parameter for the dilated Euclidean DGF when applied to the strategy space
of an EFG. We go on to show that when a dilated DGF is paired with the online mirror descent (OMD)
algorithm, or its optimistic variant, the resulting algorithm decomposes into a recursive application of local
online mirror descent algorithms at each information set of the game. This decomposition is similar to
the decomposition achieved in the counterfactual regret minimization framework, where a local regret
minimizer is applied on the counterfactual regret at each information set. This localization of the updates
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along the tree structure enables further techniques, such as distributing the updates (Brown & Sandholm,
2017b; Brown et al., 2015) or skipping updates on cold parts of the game tree (Brown & Sandholm, 2017a).
It is well-known that the entropy DGF is the theoretically superior DGF when applied to optimization over
a simplex (Hoda et al., 2010). For the treeplex case where the entropy DGF is used at each information set,
Kroer et al. (2018b) showed that the strong theoretical properties of the simplex entropy DGF generalize
to the dilated entropy DGF on a treeplex (with earlier weaker results shown by Kroer et al. (2015)). Our
results on the dilated Euclidean DGF confirm this finding, as the dilated Euclidean DGF has a similar strong
convexity parameter, but with respect to the `2 norm, rather than the `1 norm for dilated entropy (having
strong convexity with respect to the `1 norm leads to a tighter convergence-rate bound because it gives a
smaller matrix norm, another important constant in the rate).
In contrast to these theoretical results, for the case of computing a Nash equilibrium in matrix games
it has been found experimentally that the Euclidean DGF often performs much better than the entropy
DGF. This was shown by Chambolle & Pock (2016) when using a particular accelerated primal-dual
algorithm (Chambolle & Pock, 2011; 2016) and using the last iterate (as opposed to the uniformly-averaged
iterate as the theory suggests). Kroer (2019) recently showed that this extends to the theoretically-sound
case of using linear or quadratic averaging in the same primal-dual algorithm, or in mirror prox (Nemirovski,
2004) (the offline variant of optimistic OMD). In this paper we replicate these results when using OCO
algorithms: first we show it on a particular matrix game, where we also exhibit a slow T−0.74 convergence
rate of CFR+ (the slowest CFR+ rate seen to the best of our knowledge). We show that for the Kuhn
poker game the last iterate of optimistic OCO algorithms with the dilated Euclidean DGF also converges
extremely fast. In contrast to this, we show that for deeper EFGs CFR+ is still faster. Finally we compare
the performance of CFR+ and optimistic OCO algorithms for minimizing regret, where we find that OCO
algorithms perform better.
2. Regret Minimization Algorithms
In this section we present the regret-minimization algorithms that we will work with. We will operate within
the framework of online convex optimization (Zinkevich, 2003). In this setting, a decision maker repeatedly
plays against an unknown environment by making decision x1,x2, . . . ∈ X for some convex compact set
X . After each decision xt at time t, the decision maker faces a linear loss xt 7→ 〈`t,xt〉, where `t is a
vector in X . Summarizing, the decision maker makes a decision xt+1 based on the sequence of losses
`1, . . . , `t as well as the sequence of past iterates x1, . . . ,xt.
The quality metric for a regret minimizer is its cumulative regret, which is the difference between the loss
cumulated by the sequence of decisions x1, . . . ,xT and the loss that would have been cumulated by playing
the best-in-hindsight time-independent decision xˆ. Formally, the cumulative regret up to time T is
RT :=
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xt〉 − min
xˆ∈X
{ T∑
t=1
〈`t, xˆ〉
}
.
A “good” regret minimizer is such that the cumulative regret grows sublinearly in T .
The algorithms we consider assume access to a distance-generating function d : X → R, which is 1-strongly
convex (with respect to some norm) and continuously differentiable on the interior of X . Furthermore d
should be such that the gradient of the convex conjugate ∇d(g) = argmaxx∈X 〈g,x〉 − d(x) is easy to
compute. Following Hoda et al. (2010) we say that a DGF satisfying these properties is a nice DGF for X .
From d we also construct the Bregman divergence D(x ‖ x′) := d(x)− d(x′)− 〈∇d(x′),x− x′〉.
First we present two classical regret minimization algorithms. The online mirror descent (OMD) algorithm
produces iterates according to the rule
xt+1 = argmin
x∈X
{
〈`t,x〉+ 1
η
D(x ‖ xt)
}
. (1)
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The follow the regularized leader (FTRL) algorithm produces iterates according to the rule (Shalev-Shwartz
& Singer, 2007)
xt+1 = argmin
x∈X
{〈 t∑
τ=1
`τ ,x
〉
+
1
η
d(x)
}
. (2)
OMD and FTRL satisfy regret bounds of the form RT ≤ O
(
D(x∗‖x1)L√T
)
(e.g. Hazan (2016)).
The optimistic variants of the classical regret minimization algorithms take as input an additional vector
mt+1, which is an estimate of the loss faced at time t+ 1 (Chiang et al., 2012; Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013a).
Optimistic OMD produces iterates according to the rule (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013a) (note that xt+1 is
produced before seeing `t+1, while zt+1 is produced after)
xt+1 = argmin
x∈X
{
〈mt+1,x〉+ 1
η
D(x ‖ zt)
}
, zt+1 = argmin
z∈X
{
〈`t+1, z〉+ 1
η
D(z ‖ zt)
}
. (3)
Thus it is like OMD, except that xt+1 is generated by an additional step taken using the loss estimate.
This additional step is transient in the sense that xt+1 is not used as a center for the next iterate. OFTRL
produces iterates according to the rule (Rakhlin & Sridharan, 2013a; Syrgkanis et al., 2015)
xt+1 = argmin
x∈X
{〈
mt+1 +
t∑
τ=1
`τ ,x
〉
+
1
η
d(x)
}
. (4)
Again the loss estimate is used in a transient way: it is used as if we already saw the loss at time t+ 1, but
then discarded and not used in future iterations.
2.1. Connection to Saddle Points
A bilinear saddle-point problem is a problem of the form minx∈X maxy∈Y
{
x>Ay
}
,whereX ,Y are closed
convex sets. This general formulation allows us to capture, among other settings, several game-theoretical
applications such as computing Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. In that setting, X and Y are
convex polytopes whose description is provided by the sequence-form constraints, and A is a real payoff
matrix (von Stengel, 1996).
The error metric that we use is the saddle-point residual (or gap) ξ of (x¯, y¯), defined as ξ(x¯, y¯) :=
maxyˆ∈Y〈x¯,Ayˆ〉 −minxˆ∈X 〈xˆ,Ay¯〉. A well-known folk theorem shows that the average of a sequence of
regret-minimizing strategies for the choice of losses `tX : X 3 x 7→ (−Ayt)>x, `tY : Y 3 y 7→ (A>xt)>y
leads to a bounded saddle-point residual, since one has
ξ(x¯, y¯) =
1
T
(RTX +R
T
Y). (5)
When X ,Y are the players’ sequence-form strategy spaces, this implies that the average strategy profile
produced by the regret minimizers is a 1/T(RTX +R
T
Y)-Nash equilibrium. This also implies that by using
online mirror descent or follow-the-regularizer-leader, one obtains an anytime algorithm for computing
a Nash equilibrium. In particular, at each time T , the average strategy output by each of the two regret
minimizers forms a -Nash equilibrium, where  = O(T−0.5).
2.2. RVU Property and Fast Convergence to Saddle Points
Both optimistic OMD and optimistic FTRL satisfy the Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities (RVU)
property, as given by Syrgkanis et al.:
Definition 1 (RVU property, (Syrgkanis et al., 2015)). We say that a regret minimizer satisfies the RVU
property if there exist constants α > 0 and 0 < β ≤ γ, as well as a pair of dual norms (‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗) such
that, no matter what the loss functions `1, . . . , `T are,
RT ≤ α+ β
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ − γ
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt−1‖2. (RVU)
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The definition given here is slightly more general than that of Syrgkanis et al. (2015): we allow a general
estimate mt of `t, whereas their definition requires using mt = `t−1. While the choice mt = `t−1 is
often reasonable, in some cases other definitions of the loss prediction are more natural (Farina et al., 2019).
In practice, both optimistic OMD and optimistic FTRL satisfy a parametric notion of the RVU property,
which depends on the value of the step-size parameter that was chosen to set up either algorithm.
Theorem 1 (Syrgkanis et al. (2015)). For all step-size parameters η > 0, Optimistic OMD satisfies the
RVU conditions with respect to the primal-dual norm pair (‖ · ‖1, ‖ · ‖∞) with parameters α = R/η, β =
η, γ = 1/(8η), where R is a constant that scales with the maximum allowed norm of any loss function `.
Theorem 2. For all step-size parameters η > 0, OFTRL satisfies the RVU conditions with respect
to any primal-dual norm pair (‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗) with parameters α = ∆d/η, β = η, γ = 1/(4η), where
∆d := maxx,y∈X {d(x)− d(y)}.
Our proof, available in the appendix of the full paper, generalizes the work by Syrgkanis et al. (2015) by
extending the proof beyond simplex domains and beyond the fixed choice mt = `t−1.
It turns out that this is enough to accelerate the convergence to a saddle point in the construction of
Section 2.1. In particular, by letting the predictions be defined as mtX := `
t−1
X ,m
t
Y := `
t−1
Y , we obtain
that the residual ξ of the average decisions (x¯, y¯) satisfies
Tξ(x¯, y¯) ≤ 2α
′
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
(
‖−Ayt +Ayt−1‖2∗ + ‖A>xt −A>xt−1‖2∗
)
− γ
′
η
T∑
t=1
(
‖xt − xt−1‖2 + ‖yt − yt−1‖2
)
≤ 2α
′
η
+
(
η‖A‖2op −
γ ′
η
)( T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt−1‖2 +
T∑
t=1
‖yt − yt−1‖2
)
,
where the first inequality holds by plugging (RVU) into (5), and the second inequality by noting that the
operator norm ‖ · ‖op of a linear function is equal to the operator norm of its transpose. This implies that
when the step-size parameter is chosen as η =
√
γ ′
‖A‖op , the saddle-point gap ξ(x¯, y¯) satisfies ξ(x¯, y¯) ≤
2α′‖A‖op
T
√
γ ′ = O(T
−1).
3. Treeplexes and Sequence Form
We formalize a sequential decision process as follows. We assume that we have a set of decision points J .
Each decision point j ∈ J has a set of actions Aj of size nj . Given a specific action at j, the set of possible
decision points that the agent may next face is denoted by Cj,a. It can be an empty set if no more actions are
taken after j, a. We assume that the decision points form a tree, that is, Cj,a ∩Cj′,a′ = ∅ for all other convex
sets and action choices j′, a′. This condition is equivalent to the perfect-recall assumption in extensive-form
games, and to conditioning on the full sequence of actions and observations in a finite-horizon partially-
observable decision process. In our definition, the decision space starts with a root decision point, whereas
in practice multiple root decision points may be needed, for example in order to model different starting
hands in card games. Multiple root decision points can be modeled by having a dummy root decision point
with only a single action.
The set of possible next decision points after choosing action a ∈ Aj at decision point j ∈ J , denoted
Cj,a, can be thought of as representing the different decision points that an agent may face after taking
action a and then making an observation on which she can condition her next action choice. In addition
to games, our model of sequential decision process captures, for example, partially-observable Markov
decision processes and Markov decision processes where we condition on the entire history of observations
and actions.
5
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X0
X3
X6
X2
X5
X1
X4
start
fold call fold call fold call
check raise check raise check raise
jack queen king
check raise check raise check raise
Figure 1. Sequential action space for the first player
in the game of Kuhn poker. denotes an observation
point; represents the end of the decision process.
As an illustration, consider the game of Kuhn
poker (Kuhn, 1950). Kuhn poker consists of a three-
card deck: king, queen, and jack. The action space
for the first player is shown in Figure 1. For instance,
we have: J = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}; n0 = 1; nj = 2
for all j ∈ J \ {0}; A0 = {start}, A1 = A2 =
A3 = {check, raise}, A4 = A5 = A6 = {fold, call};
C0,start = {1, 2, 3}, C1,raise = ∅, C3,check = {6}; etc.
The expected loss for a given strategy is non-linear in
the vectors of probability masses for each decision point
j. This non-linearity is due to the probability of reach-
ing each j, which is computed as the product of the
probabilities of all actions on the path to from the root to
j. An alternative formulation which preserves linearity
is called the sequence form. In the sequence-form representation, the simplex strategy space at a generic
decision point j ∈ J is scaled by the decision variable associated with the last action in the path from the
root of the process to j. In this formulation, the value of a particular action represents the probability of
playing the whole sequence of actions from the root to that action. This allows each term in the expected
loss to be weighted only by the sequence ending in the corresponding action. The sequence form has been
used to instantiate linear programming (von Stengel, 1996) and first-order methods (Hoda et al., 2010;
Kroer et al., 2015; 2018b) for computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum EFGs. Formally, the sequence-form
representation X of a sequential decision process can be obtained recursively, as follows: for every j ∈ J ,
a ∈ Aj , we let X↓j,a :=
∏
j′∈Cj,a X↓j′ , where Π denotes Cartesian product; at every decision point j ∈ J ,
we let
X↓j := {(λ1, . . . , λnj , λ1xa1 , . . . , λnjxanj ) : (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ ∆nj ,xa ∈ X↓j,a ∀ a ∈ Aj},
where we assumed Aj = {a1, . . . , anj}.
The sequence form strategy space for the whole sequential decision process is then X := {1} ×X↓r, where
r is the root of the process. The first entry, identically equal to 1 for any point in X , corresponds to what is
called the empty sequence. Crucially, X is a convex and compact set, and the expected loss of the process
is a linear function over X . With the sequence-form representation the problem of computing a Nash
equilibrium in an EFG can be formulated as a bilinear saddle-point problem (see Section 2.1), where X and
Y are the sequence-form strategy spaces of the sequential decision processes faced by the two players, and
A is a sparse matrix encoding the leaf payoffs of the game.
As we have already observed, vectors that pertain to the sequence form have one entry for each sequence of
the decision process. We denote with vφ the entry in v corresponding to the empty sequence, and vja the
entry corresponding to any other sequence (j, a) where j ∈ J , a ∈ Aj . Sometimes, we will need to slice a
vector v and isolate only those entries that refer to all decision points j′ and actions a′ ∈ Aj′ that are at or
below some j ∈ J ; we will denote such operation as v↓j . Similarly, we introduce the syntax vj to denote
the subset of nj = |Aj | entries of v that pertain to all actions a ∈ Aj at decision point j ∈ J . Finally, note
that for any j ∈ J − {r} there is a unique sequence (j′, a′), denoted pj and called the parent sequence
of decision point j, such that j ∈ Cj′a′ . When j = r is the root decision point, we let pr := φ, the empty
sequence.
4. Dilated Distance Generating Functions
We will be interested in a particular type of DGF which is suitable for sequential decision-making problems:
a dilated DGF. A dilated DGF is constructed by taking a sum over suitable local DGFs for each decision
point, where each local DGF is dilated by the parent variable leading to the decision point: d(x) =∑
j∈J xpj dj
(
xj
xpj
)
. Each “local” DGF dj is given the local variable xj divided by xpj , so that
xj
xpj
∈ ∆nj .
The idea is that dj can be any DGF suitable for ∆nj ; by multiplying dj by xpj and taking a sum over J
6
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we construct a DGF for the whole treeplex from these local DGFs. Hoda et al. (2010) showed that dilated
DGFs have many of the desired properties of a DGF for an optimization problem over a treeplex.
We now present two local DGFs for simplexes, that are by far the most common in practice. In the following
we let b be a vector in the n-dimensional simplex ∆n. First, the Euclidean DGF d(b) = ‖b‖22, which is
1-strongly convex with respect to the `2 norm; secondly, the negative entropy DGF d(b) =
∑n
i=1 bi log(bi)
(we will henceforth drop the “negative” and simply refer to it as the entropy DGF), which is 1-strongly
convex with respect to the `1 norm. The strong convexity properties of the dilated entropy DGF were shown
by Kroer et al. (2018b) (with earlier weaker results shown by Kroer et al. (2015)). However, for the dilated
Euclidean DGF a setup for achieving a strong-convexity parameter of 1 was unknown until now; Hoda et al.
(2010) show that a strong-convexity parameter exists, but do not show what it is for the general case (they
give specific results for a particular class of uniform treeplexes). We now show how to achieve this.
We are now ready to state our first result on dilated regularizers that are strongly convex with respect to the
Euclidean norm:
Theorem 3. Let d(x) =
∑
j∈J xpjdj(xj/xpj ) where for all j, dj is µj-strongly convex with respect to
the Euclidean norm over ∆nj . Furthermore, define σja :=
µj
2 −
∑
j′∈Cja µj′ , and σ¯ := minja σja. Then,
d is σ¯-strongly convex with respect to the Euclidean norm over X .
We can immediately use Theorem 3 to prove the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Let σ¯ > 0 be arbitrary, and for all j let dj be a µj-strongly convex function over ∆nj with
respect to the Euclidean norm, where the µj’s satisfy
µj = 2σ¯ + 2 max
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
µj′ . (6)
Then, d(x) =
∑
j∈J xpjdj(xj/xpj ) is σ¯-strongly convex over X with respect to the Euclidean norm.
5. Local Regret Minimization
We now show that OMD and Optimistic OMD run on a treeplex X with a dilated DGF can both be
interpreted as locally minimizing a modified variant of loss at each information set, with correspondingly-
modified loss predictions. The modified local loss at a given information set j takes into account the loss
and DGF below j by adding the expectation with respect to the next iterate xt↓j . In practice this modified
loss is easily handled by computing xt bottom-up, thereby visiting j after having visited the whole subtree
below.
We first show that the problem of computing the prox mapping, the minimizer of a linear term plus the
Bregman divergence, decomposes into local prox mappings at each simplex of a treeplex. This will then be
used to show that OMD and Optimistic OMD can be viewed as a tree of local simplex-instantiations of the
respective algorithms.
5.1. Decomposition into Local Prox Mappings with a Dilated DGF
We will be interested in solving the following prox mapping, which takes place in the sequence form:
Prox(g, xˆ) = argmin
x∈X
{〈g,x〉+D(x ‖ xˆ)}. (7)
The reason is that the update applied at each iteration of several OCO algorithms run on the sequence-form
polytope of X can be described as an instantiation of this prox mapping. We now show that this update can
be interpreted as a local prox mapping at each decision point, but with a new loss gˆj that depends on the
update applied in the subtree beneath j.
Proposition 1 (Decomposition into local prox mappings). A prox mapping (7) on a treeplex with a Bregman
divergence constructed from a dilated DGF decomposes into local prox mappings at each decision point j
where the solution is as follows:
x∗j = xpj · argmin
bj∈∆nj
{
〈gˆj , bj〉+Dj
(
bj
∥∥∥∥ xˆjxˆpj
)}
,
7
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where
gˆj,a = gj,a +
∑
j′∈Cj,a
[
d∗↓j′
(− g↓j′ +∇d↓j′(xˆ↓j′))− dj′( xˆj
xˆpj
)
+
〈
∇dj′
(
xˆj′
xˆpj′
)
,
xˆj′
xˆpj′
〉]
.
Hoda et al. (2010) and Kroer et al. (2018a) gave variations on a similar result: that the convex conjugate
d∗↓j(−g) can be computed in bottom-up fashion similar to the recursion we show here. Proposition 1 is
slightly different in that we additionally show that the Bregman divergence also survives the decomposition
and can be viewed as a local Bregman divergence. This latter difference will be necessary for showing that
OMD can be interpreted as a local RM.
5.2. Decomposition into Local Regret Minimizers
With Proposition 1 it follows almost directly that OMD and Optimistic OMD can be seen as a set of local
regret minimizers, one for each simplex. Each produces iterates from their respective simplex, with the
overall strategy produced by then applying the sequence-form transformation to these local iterates.
Theorem 4. OMD with a dilated DGF for a treeplex X corresponds to running OMD locally at each
simplex j, with the local loss ˆ`t constructed according to Proposition 1. Optimistic OMD corresponds to
the optimistic variant of this local OMD with local loss predictions ˆ`t, mˆt+1j again constructed according
to Proposition 1 using xt as Bregman divergence center and xt+1 for aggregating losses below each
simplex. Here the modified loss uses zt↓j′ and x
t+1 as Bregman divergence center and aggregating loss
below, respectively. The prediction mˆt+1j uses z
t
↓j′ and z
t+1.
Unlike OMD and its optimistic variant, it is not the case that FTRL has a nice interpretation as a local regret
minimizer. The reason is that the prox mapping in (2) or (4) minimizes the sum of losses, rather than the
most recent loss. Because of this, the expected value 〈∑tτ=1 `τ↓j ,xt+1↓j 〉 at simplex j, which influences
the modified loss at parent simplexes, is computed based on xt+1 for all t losses. Thus there is no local
modified loss that could be received at rounds 1 through t that accurately reflects the modified loss needed
in Proposition 1.
6. Experimental Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate the performance of optimistic regret minimization methods instantiated with
dilated distance-generating functions. We experiment on three games:
• Smallmatrix, a small 2 × 2 matrix game. Given a mixed strategy x = (x1, x2) ∈ ∆2 for Player 1
and a mixed strategy y = (y1, y2) ∈ ∆2 for Player 2, the payoff function for player 1 is u(x, y) =
5x1y1 − x1y2 + x2y2.
• Kuhn poker, already introduced in Section 3. In Kuhn poker, each player first has to put a payment of 1
into the pot. Each player is then dealt one of the three cards, and the third is put aside unseen. A single
round of betting then occurs: first, Player 1 can check or bet 1. Then,
– If Player 1 checks Player 2 can check or raise 1.
∗ If Player 2 checks a showdown occurs; if Player 2 raises Player 1 can fold or call.
· If Player 1 folds Player 2 takes the pot; if Player 1 calls a showdown occurs.
– If Player 1 raises Player 2 can fold or call.
∗ If Player 2 folds Player 1 takes the pot; if Player 2 calls a showdown occurs.
If no player has folded, a showdown occurs where the player with the higher card wins.
• Leduc poker, a standard benchmark in imperfect-information game solving (Southey et al., 2005). The
game is played with a deck consisting of 5 unique cards with 2 copies of each, and consists of two rounds.
In the first round, each player places an ante of 1 in the pot and receives a single private card. A round of
betting then takes place with a two-bet maximum, with Player 1 going first. A public shared card is then
dealt face up and another round of betting takes place. Again, Player 1 goes first, and there is a two-bet
maximum. If one of the players has a pair with the public card, that player wins. Otherwise, the player
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with the higher card wins. All bets in the first round are 1, while all bets in the second round are 2. This
game has 390 decision points and 911 sequences per player.
Fast Last-Iterate Convergence. In the first set of experiments (Figure 2, top row), we compare the
saddle-point gap of the strategy profiles produced by optimistic OMD and optimistic FTRL to that produced
by CFR and CFR+. Optimistic OMD and optimistic FTRL were set up with the step-size parameter
η = 0.1 in Smallmatrix and η = 2 in Kuhn Poker, and the plots show the last-iterate convergence for the
optimistic algorithms, which has recently received attention in the works by Chambolle & Pock (2016)
and Kroer (2019). Finally, we instantiated optimistic OMD and optimistic FTRL with the Euclidean
distance generating function as constructed in Corollary 1. The plots show that—at least in these shallow
games—optimistic methods are able to produce even up to 12 orders of magnitude better-approximate
saddle-points than CFR and CFR+.
Interestingly, Smallmatrix appears to be a hard instance for CFR+: linear regression on the first 20 000
iterations of CFR+ shows, with a coefficient of determination of roughly 0.96, that log ξ(xT∗ ,y
T
∗ ) ≈
−0.7375 · log(T )−2.1349, where (xT∗ ,yT∗ ) is the average strategy profile (computed using linear averaging,
as per CFR+’s construction) up to time T . In other words, we have evidence of at least one game in
which the approximate saddle-point computed by CFR+ experimentally has residual bounded below by
Ω(T−0.74). This observation suggests that the analysis of CFR+ might actually be quite tight, and that
CFR+ is not an accelerated method.
Figure 2 (bottom left) shows the performance of OFTRL in Leduc Poker, compared to CFR and CFR+ (we
do not show optimistic OMD, which we found to have worse performance than OFTRL). Here OFTRL
performs worse than CFR+. This shows that in deeper games, more work has to be done to fully exploit the
accelerated bounds of optimistic regret minimization methods.
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Figure 2. (Left and upper right) Saddle-point gap as a function of the number of iterations. The plots show the
last-iterate convergence for OOMD and OFTRL.(Lower right) Sum of cumulative regret for both players in Leduc.
Optimistic OMD (OOMD) and OFTRL use step-size parameter η = 0.1 in Smallmatrix and η = 2 in Kuhn. OFTRL
uses step-size parameter η = 200 in Leduc.
Comparing the Cumulative Regret. We also compared the algorithms based on the sum of cumulative
regrets (again we omit optimistic OMD, which performed worse than OFTRL). In all three games, OFTRL
leads to lower sum of cumulative regrets. Figure 2 (bottom right) shows the performance of OFTRL
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in Leduc Poker. Here, we used the usual average of iterates x¯ := 1/T
∑T
t=1 x
t (note that the choice of
averaging strategy has no effect on the bottom right plot.)
OFTRL’s performance matches the theory from Theorem 2 and Section 2.2. In particular, we observe that
while OFTRL does not beat the state-of-the-art CFR+ in terms of saddle-point gap, it beats it according
to the regret sum metric. The fact that CFR+ performs worse with respect to the regret sum metric is
somewhat surprising: the entire derivation of CFR and CFR+ is based on showing bounds on the regret
sum. However, the connection between regret and saddle-point gap (or exploitability) is one-way: if the
two regret minimizers (one per player) have regret R1 and R2, then the saddle point gap can be easily
shown to be less than or equal to (R1 + R2)/T . However, nothing prevents it from being much smaller
than (R1 +R2)/T . What we empirically find is that for CFR+ this bound is very loose. We are not sure
why this is the case, and it potentially warrants further investigation in the future.
7. Conclusions
We studied how optimistic regret minimization can be applied in the context of extensive-form games,
and introduced the first instantiations of regret-based techniques that achieve T−1 convergence to Nash
equilibrium in extensive-form games. These methods rely crucially on having a tractable regularizer to
maintain feasibility and control the stepsizes on the domain at hand—in our case, the sequence-form
polytope. We provided the first explicit bound on the strong convexity properties of dilated distance-
generating functions with respect to the Euclidean norm. We also showed that when optimistic regret
minimization methods are instantiated with dilated distance-generating functions, the regret updates are
local to each information set in the game, mirroring the structure of the counterfactual regret minimization
framework. This localization of the updates along the tree structure enables further techniques, such as
distributing the updates or skipping updates on cold parts of the game tree. Finally, when used in self
play, these optimistic regret minimization methods guarantee an optimal T−1 convergence rate to Nash
equilibrium.
We demonstrate that in shallow games, methods based on optimistic regret minimization can significantly
outperform CFR and CFR+—even up to 12 orders of magnitude. In deeper games, more work has to
be done to fully exploit the accelerated bounds of optimistic regret minimization methods. However,
while the strong CFR+ performance in large games remains a mystery, we elucidate some points about its
performance—including showing that its theoretically slow convergence bound is somewhat tight. Finally,
we showed that when the goal is minimizing regret, rather than computing a Nash equilibrium, optimistic
methods can outperform CFR+ even in deep game trees.
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A. Proofs: Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader
A.1. Continuity of the Argmin-Function
Intuitively, the role of the regularizer d is to smooth out the linear objective function 〈·,L〉. So, it seems
only reasonable to expect that, the higher the constant that multiplies d, the less the argmin x˜(L) =
argminx∈X 〈L,x〉+ 1ηd(x) is affected by small changes in L. In fact, the following holds:
Lemma 1. Let d be 1-strongly convex with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖. The argmin-function x˜ is η-Lipschitz
continuous with respect to the dual norm ‖ · ‖∗, that is
‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖ ≤ η‖L−L′‖∗.
Proof. The variational inequality for the optimality of x˜(L) implies〈
L+
1
η
∇d(x˜(L)), x˜(L′)− x˜(L)
〉
≥ 0. (8)
Symmetrically for x˜(L′), we find that〈
L′ +
1
η
d(x˜(L′)), x˜(L)− x˜(L′)
〉
≥ 0. (9)
Summing inequalities (8) and (9), we obtain
1
η
〈∇d(x˜(L))−∇d(x˜(L′)), x˜(L)− x˜(L′)〉 ≤ 〈L′ −L, x˜(L)− x˜(L′)〉 .
Using the 1-strong convexity of d(·) on the left-hand side and the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
on the right-hand side, we obtain
1
η
‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖2 ≤ ‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖ ‖L−L′‖∗,
and dividing by ‖x˜(L)− x˜(L′)‖ we obtain the Lipschitz continuity of the argmin-function x˜.
Another observation that will be crucial in the analysis is that the objective function 〈L,x〉+ (1/η)d(x) is
(1/η)-strongly convex. Hence, for all L and xˆ ∈ X ,(
〈L, xˆ〉+ 1
η
d(xˆ)
)
≥
(
〈L, x˜(L)〉+ 1
η
d(x˜(L))
)
+
1
2η
‖xˆ− x˜(L)‖2. (10)
A.1.1. THE OMNISCIENT CASE
The RVU property (Definition 1) implies that if mt = `t for all t = 1, . . . , T , then the regret cumulated
is bounded above by a constant, independent on the time horizon T , and can only go down over time.
We now show that this indeed holds for OFTRL. In what follows, we will use the notation Lt to denote
Lt :=
∑t
τ=1 `
τ for all t ≥ 1, and L0 := 0.
Lemma 2. Let T > 0, and assume that OFTRL is set up so that `t = mt (i.e., the prediction is omniscient)
for all t = 1, . . . , T . Furthermore, denote xto := x˜(L
t) the decisions produces by OFTRL at all times
t ≥ 0. Then, the regret against any strategy xˆ ∈ X is bounded above as
RT (xˆ) :=
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto − xˆ〉 ≤
1
η
(
d(xˆ)− d(x0o)
)− 1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖xto − xt−1o ‖2.
As a direct consequence, if OFTRL is fed with exact predictions, the cumulated regret is bounded as
RT = max
xˆ∈X
RT (xˆ) ≤ ∆d
η
− 1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖xto − xt−1o ‖2,
where ∆d := maxx,y∈X {d(x)− d(y)}.
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Proof. Equation (10) immediately implies that for all xˆ ∈ X and time t,
〈Lt, xˆ− xto〉 ≥ −
1
η
(
d(xˆ)− d(xto)
)
+
1
2η
‖xˆ− xto‖2. (11)
Consequently, for all xˆ ∈ X we have
〈LT ,xTo − xˆ〉 = 〈`T ,xTo − xˆ〉+ 〈LT−1,xT−1o − xˆ〉+ 〈LT−1,xTo − xT−1o 〉
≥ 〈LT−1,xT−1o − xˆ〉+ 〈`T ,xTo − xˆ〉 −
1
η
(d(xTo )− d(xT−1o )) +
1
2η
‖xTo − xT−1o ‖2,
(12)
where the first inequality is by (11) applied to xˆ = xT and t = T − 1. Using (12) inductively (recursively
expanding terms of the form 〈Lt,xto − xˆ〉 for all t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1), we obtain
〈LT ,xTo − xˆ〉 ≥
(
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto − xˆ〉
)
− 1
η
(
d(xTo )− d(x0o)
)
+
1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖xto − xt−1o ‖2,
Finally, inverting the sides of the inequality, we find
RT (xˆ) =
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto − xˆ〉
≤ 〈LT ,xTo − xˆ〉+
1
η
(
d(xTo )− d(x0o)
)− 1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖xto − xt−1o ‖2
≤ 1
η
(
d(xˆ)− d(xTo )
)
+
1
η
(
d(xTo )− d(x0o)
)− 1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖xto − xt−1o ‖2
=
1
η
(
d(xˆ)− d(x0o)
)− 1
2η
T∑
t=1
‖xto − xt−1o ‖2
where the second inequality is by (11) applied to t = T .
A.2. Bridging the Gap: The Non-Omniscient Case
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 2. The idea of the proof is to use the Lipschitz
continuity of the argmin-function (Lemma 1) to show that the regret generated by the non-omniscience of
the OFTRL (that is, the fact that mt 6= `t) is proportional to the distance∑t ‖mt − `t‖2∗. A naive attempt
would could be as follows:
〈`t,xt〉 = 〈`t, x˜(Lt)〉+ 〈`t, x˜(Lt−1 +mt)− x˜(Lt)〉
≤ 〈`t, x˜(Lt)〉+ η‖`t‖∗‖`t −mt‖∗,
where the inequality follows from from the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and from Lemma 1.
Unfortunately, the approach above is not powerful enough, as it would imply that the increase in regret is
proportional to
∑
t ‖mt − `t‖∗ (notice the different exponent). In order to obtain the better bound, we
write instead
〈`t,xt〉 = 〈`t, x˜(Lt)〉+ 〈`t −mt, x˜(Lt−1 +mt)− x˜(Lt)〉+ 〈mt, x˜(Lt−1 +mt)− x˜(Lt)〉
≤ 〈`t, x˜(Lt)〉+ η‖`t −mt‖2∗ + 〈mt, x˜(Lt−1 +mt)− x˜(Lt)〉. (13)
The first term corresponds to the case of omniscient predictions, which was already analyzed in the previous
section. Hence, we are left with the task of bounding the loss from the last term. To this end, we will use
the following lemma:
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Lemma 3. Let xt := x˜(Lt−1 +mt) and xto := x˜(Lt). For all T ,
T∑
t=1
〈mt,xt − xto〉 ≤ −RTo +
∆d
η
− 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2
where
RTo := max
xˆ∈X
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto − xˆ〉
is the regret of the omniscient minimizer.
Proof. We will make use of the following two inequalities, which are direct applications of (10) where L is
set to Lt−1 +mt and Lt−1, respectively, and xˆ is set to xto and x
t, respectively:
〈Lt−1 +mt,xt〉 ≤ 〈Lt−1 +mt,xto〉 −
1
η
(
d(xt)− d(xto)
)− 1
2η
‖xt − xto‖2, (14)
〈Lt−1,xt−1o 〉 ≤ 〈Lt−1,xt〉 −
1
η
(
d(xt−1o )− d(xt)
)− 1
2η
‖xt − xt−1o ‖2. (15)
With the above, we can write, for all timesteps t,
〈mt,xt − xto〉 = −〈mt,xto〉+ 〈Lt−1 +mt,xt〉 − 〈Lt−1,xt〉
≤ −〈mt,xto〉+ 〈Lt−1 +mt,xt〉 − 〈Lt−1,xt−1o 〉 −
1
η
(
d(xt−1o )− d(xt)
)− 1
2η
‖xt − xt−1o ‖2
≤ −〈mt,xto〉+ 〈Lt−1 +mt,xto〉 − 〈Lt−1,xt−1o 〉 −
1
η
(
d(xt)− d(xto)
)− 1
η
(
d(xt−1o )− d(xt)
)
− 1
2η
‖xt − xto‖2 −
1
2η
‖xt − xt−1o ‖2
= 〈Lt−1,xto − xt−1o 〉+
1
η
(
d(xto)− d(xt−1o )
)− 1
2η
‖xt − xto‖2 −
1
2η
‖xt − xt−1o ‖2,
where the first inequality follows from (15) and the second inequality follows from (14). Note that
〈Lt−1,xto − xt−1o 〉 = 〈Lt,xto〉 − 〈Lt−1,xt−1o 〉 − 〈`t,xto〉.
Hence,
〈mt,xt−xto〉 ≤ 〈Lt,xto〉−〈Lt−1,xt−1o 〉−〈`t,xt〉+
1
η
(
d(xto)−d(xt−1o )
)− 1
2η
‖xt−xto‖2−
1
2η
‖xt−xt−1o ‖2.
Finally, summing over all t, we obtain
T∑
t=1
〈mt,xt − xto〉 ≤ 〈LT ,xTo 〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto〉+
1
η
(
d(xTo )− d(x0o)
)− 1
2η
( T∑
t=1
‖xt − xto‖2 +
T∑
t=1
‖xto − xt−1o ‖2
)
≤ 〈LT ,xTo 〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto〉+
1
η
(
d(xTo )− d(x0o)
)− 1
2η
( T−1∑
t=1
‖xt − xto‖2 +
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xto‖2
)
≤ 〈LT ,xTo 〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto〉+
1
η
(
d(xTo )− d(x0o)
)− 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2, (16)
where the first inequality comes from simplifying telescopic sums, the second by removing some term from
the last parenthesis, and the third from the parallelogram inequality
‖a‖2 + ‖b‖2 ≥ 1
2
‖a− b‖2,
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which holds for all choice of vectors a, b, c and norm ‖ · ‖. The last step of the proof is to notice that by (11)
〈LT ,xTo 〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto〉 ≤ 〈LT , xˆ〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto〉+
1
η
(
d(xˆ)− d(xTo )
)
= −RTo (xˆ) +
1
η
(
d(xˆ)− d(xTo )
)
for all xˆ ∈ X . Substituting into (16) yields
T∑
t=1
〈mt,xt − xto〉 ≤ −RTo (xˆ) +
1
η
(
d(xˆ)− d(x0o)
)− 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2
= −RTo +
∆d
η
− 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2,
as we wanted to show.
Finally, using Lemma 3 together with (13) and Lemma 2, we obtain the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For all step-size parameters η > 0, OFTRL satisfies the RVU conditions with respect
to any primal-dual norm pair (‖ · ‖, ‖ · ‖∗) with parameters α = ∆d/η, β = η, γ = 1/(4η), where
∆d := maxx,y∈X {d(x)− d(y)}.
Proof of Theorem 2. As we already mentioned, the fundamental idea of the proof is to bound how much
regret is generated from by the fact that the predictions mt are not perfect. Hence, the first step is to relate
the notion of regret to the fact that the decisions produced are xt instead of xto:
RT = max
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xt − xˆ〉
}
= max
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xto − xˆ〉
}
+
T∑
t=1
〈`t −mt,xt − xto〉+
T∑
t=1
〈mt,xt − xto〉.
The sum inside of the max is bounded according to the analysis of the omniscient case (Lemma 2). Using
the (generalized) Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the Lipschitz continuity of x˜, the sum in the middle can
be easily bounded as
T∑
t=1
〈`t −mt,xt − xto〉 ≤ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗.
Finally, the third summation was studied in Lemma 3. Putting everything together, we conclude that
RT ≤ RTo + η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −RTo +
∆d
η
− 1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt−1‖2
≤ ∆d
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖xt − xt−1‖2.
B. Proofs: Dilated Entropy Distance Generating Function
In the proof of Theorem 3, we will make use of the following, useful fact.
Lemma 4. Let d(x)=
∑
j∈J xpjdj(xj/xpj ) be a dilated DGF. Then, for all x we have 〈∇d(x),x〉=d(x).
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Proof. With some simple algebra, it is easy to show that the partial derivatives with respect to xja is
∂d
∂xja
(x) =
∂rj
∂xja
(
xj
xpj
)
+
∑
j′∈Cja
dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
−
∑
j′∈Cja
〈
∇dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
,
xj′
xja
〉
,
and that the partial derivative of d with respect to xφ is
∂d
∂xφ
(x) = dr
(
xr
xφ
)
−
〈
∇dr
(
xr
xφ
)
,
xr
xφ
〉
.
As a consequence, for all j ∈ J ,
〈∇xjd(x), xj〉 = 〈∇dj( xjxpj
)
,xj
〉
−
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
〈
∇dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
, xj′
〉
+
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
xja dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
Hence,
〈∇d(x),x〉 = ∂d
∂xφ
(x) +
∑
j
〈∇xjd(x), xj〉
= dr
(
xr
xφ
)
+
∑
j∈J
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
xja dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
=
∑
j∈J
xpjdj
(
xj
xpj
)
= d(x),
where the second inequality comes from the observation that the inner products with the gradients cancel
out.
Theorem 3. Let d(x) =
∑
j∈J xpjdj(xj/xpj ) where for all j, dj is µj-strongly convex with respect to
the Euclidean norm over ∆nj . Furthermore, define σja :=
µj
2 −
∑
j′∈Cja µj′ , and σ¯ := minja σja. Then,
d is σ¯-strongly convex with respect to the Euclidean norm over X .
Proof. Let x, y be arbitrary vectors in ∈ X . Using the strong convexity of dj and the fact that x ∈ X , we
obtain for all j ∈ J
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
yja dj′
(
yj′
yja
)
≥
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
yja ·
(
dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
+
〈
∇dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
,
yj′
yja
− xj′
xja
〉
+
µj′
2
∥∥∥∥yj′yja − xj′xja
∥∥∥∥2
2
)
=
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
yja dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
−
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
yja
〈
∇dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
,
xj′
xja
〉
−
〈
∇dj
(
xj
xpj
)
,yj
〉
+
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
〈
∇dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
, yj′
〉
+
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
µj′
2
yja
∥∥∥∥yj′yja − xj′xja
∥∥∥∥2
2
=
〈∇xjd(x), yj〉−〈∇dj( xjxpj
)
,yj
〉
+
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
〈
∇dj′
(
xj′
xja
)
, yj′
〉
+
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cja
µj′
2
yja
∥∥∥∥yj′yja − xj′xja
∥∥∥∥2
2
.
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Summing over all j, we obtain
d(y) ≥ 〈∇d(x),y〉+
∑
j
µj
2
ypj
∥∥∥∥ yjypj − xjxpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
= d(x) + 〈∇d(x),y − x〉+
∑
j
µj
2
ypj
∥∥∥∥ yjypj − xjxpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
≥ d(x) + 〈∇d(x),y − x〉+
∑
j
µj
2
y2pj
∥∥∥∥ yjypj − xjxpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
, (17)
where the equality comes from Lemma 4 and the second inequality from the fact that ypj ∈ [0, 1]. Note that
for all j and for all xj ,yj ,
1
2
‖yj − xj‖22 =
1
2
∥∥∥∥ypj ( yjypj − xjxpj
)
+ (ypj − xpj )
xj
xpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ y2pj
∥∥∥∥ yjypj − xjxpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
+ (ypj − xpj )2
∥∥∥∥ xjxpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
≤ y2pj
∥∥∥∥ yjypj − xjxpj
∥∥∥∥
2
+ (ypj − xpj )2, (18)
where the first inequality is by parallelogram inequality, while the second inequality follows from the fact
that xj/xpj ∈ ∆nj and therefore it has norm upper-bounded by 1. By inverting (18), we obtain
∑
j
µjy
2
pj
∥∥∥∥ yjypj − xjxpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
≥ 1
2
∑
j
µj‖yj − xj‖2 −
∑
j
µj(ypj − xpj )2
=
∑
j
∑
a∈Aj
µj
2
−
∑
j′∈Cja
µj′
 (yja − xja)2.
Finally, plugging into (17)
∑
j
µjypj
∥∥∥∥ yjypj − xjxpj
∥∥∥∥2
2
≥ σ¯
∑
j
∑
a∈Aj
(xja − yja)2 = σ¯‖y − x‖22,
and we conclude that d is σ¯-strongly convex with respect to the Euclidean norm over X , like we wanted to
show.
C. Proofs: Local Regret Minimization
Proposition 1 (Decomposition into local prox mappings). A prox mapping (7) on a treeplex with a Bregman
divergence constructed from a dilated DGF decomposes into local prox mappings at each decision point j
where the solution is as follows:
x∗j = xpj · argmin
bj∈∆nj
{
〈gˆj , bj〉+Dj
(
bj
∥∥∥∥ xˆjxˆpj
)}
,
where
gˆj,a = gj,a +
∑
j′∈Cj,a
[
d∗↓j′
(− g↓j′ +∇d↓j′(xˆ↓j′))− dj′( xˆj
xˆpj
)
+
〈
∇dj′
(
xˆj′
xˆpj′
)
,
xˆj′
xˆpj′
〉]
.
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Proof. We will show the decomposition assuming that j is the root decision point, the general case follows
by induction. The prox mapping (7) can be written as
Prox(g, xˆ) = argmin
x∈X
{〈g,x〉+D(x ‖ xˆ)}
= argmin
x∈X
{〈g,x〉+ d(x)− d(xˆ)− 〈∇d(xˆ),x− xˆ〉}
= argmin
x∈X
{〈g −∇d(xˆ),x〉+ d(x)}.
Now we can use the fact that we are using a dilated DGF and the sequential structure of SDM problems to
write the problem of finding just the minimizer for j as follows
argmin
bj∈∆nj
{
〈gj −∇jd(xˆ), bj〉+ dj(bj) +
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
bj,a
[
min
x∈X↓j′
〈g↓j′ −∇d↓j′(xˆ↓j′),x〉+ d↓j′(x)
]}
= argmin
bj∈∆nj
{
〈gj −∇jd(xˆ), bj〉+ dj(bj)−
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
bj,ad
∗
↓j′(−g↓j′ +∇d↓j′(xˆ↓j′))
}
.
Now we note that the index of∇jd(xˆ) corresponding to each a ∈ Aj can be expanded as
∇j,ad(xˆ) = ∇adj
(
xˆj
xˆpj
)
+
∑
j′∈Cj,a
(
dj′
(
xˆj′
xˆpj′
)
−
〈
∇dj′
(
xˆj′
xˆpj′
)
,
xˆj′
xˆpj′
〉)
.
Plugging this into our expression for the minimizer for j, and noting that we can add and remove dj
(
xˆj
xˆpj
)
without changing the argmin, gives
argmin
bj∈∆nj
{
〈gj , bj〉+Dj
(
bj
∥∥∥∥ xˆjxˆpj
)
−
∑
a∈Aj
∑
j′∈Cj,a
bj,a
[
d∗↓j′
(− g↓j′ +∇d↓j′(xˆ↓j′))− dj′( xˆj
xˆpj
)
+
〈
∇dj′
(
xˆj′
xˆpj′
)
,
xˆj′
xˆpj′
〉]}
= argmin
bj∈∆nj
〈gˆj , bj〉+Dj
(
bj
∥∥∥∥ xˆjxˆpj
)
as we wanted to show.
Theorem 4. OMD with a dilated DGF for a treeplex X corresponds to running OMD locally at each
simplex j, with the local loss ˆ`t constructed according to Proposition 1. Optimistic OMD corresponds to
the optimistic variant of this local OMD with local loss predictions ˆ`t, mˆt+1j again constructed according
to Proposition 1 using xt as Bregman divergence center and xt+1 for aggregating losses below each
simplex. Here the modified loss uses zt↓j′ and x
t+1 as Bregman divergence center and aggregating loss
below, respectively. The prediction mˆt+1j uses z
t
↓j′ and z
t+1.
Proof. Note that the OMD update in (1) is a prox mapping as given in Proposition 1. The update is:
xt+1 = argmin
x∈X
{
〈`t,x〉+ 1
η
D(x ‖ xt)
}
⇒ xt+1j = xt+1pj argmin
bj∈∆nj
{
〈 ˆ`t,x〉+ 1
η
Dj
(
bj
∥∥∥∥ xtxtpj
)}
.
(19)
But this is exactly the same as the OMD update resulting from running OMD on simplex j with the modified
loss, using DGF dj and its associated Bregman divergence. The same logic shows that Optimistic OMD is
a local variant of itself, since it is a repeated sequence of two prox mappings.
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